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other states which still recognize these common law tort distinctions also
followed Merlo.2
CONCLUSION
The confusion that arises out of the Primes case may be due to the same
problem that other equal protection decisions seem to have been grappling
with, namely, what is to be the test? Under what circumstances does a
statutory scheme, because it is less than perfect, become invidiously discrim-
inatory? The attempts to derive a middle scrutiny analysis appear to constitute
an effort to add flexibility to the old two-tiered standard. The use of the
irrebuttable presumption analysis, however, may unnecessarily cloud the
issues. Without advancing any legal analysis, the irrebuttable presumption
approach appears to be valuable merely as a tool to allow the court to reach
a desired result where strict scrutiny cannot be applied.
MARGARET FULLER CORNEILLE
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
Separate Legal Entity Suit by Member.
Personal Injuries • Liability . Statutory Provision
Tanner v. Loyal Order of Moose, 44 Ohio St. 2d 49, 337 N.E.2d 625 (1975)
G EORGE and Marguerite Tanner, members of the Columbus Lodge No. 11
of the Loyal Order of Moose, an unincorporated association,1 were
attending a dance sponsored by that Lodge when Mrs. Tanner slipped on a
recently waxed area of the dance floor' and sustained serious injury. The
Tanners filed suit against the Lodge in the court of common pleas,3 alleging
that the dance floor had been negligently waxed, making it slippery and thus
causing her fall.
72 Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362
(Kan. 1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N. D. 1974).
1 An unincorporated association has been defined as an organization composed of individuals
united without a charter, pursuing some common enterprise. See Local 4076, United Steel-
workers v. United Steelworkers AFL-CIO, 327 F. Supp. 1400, 1402-03 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
2 Depositions of the plaintiffs filed with the trial court indicated that shortly before Mrs.
Tanner fell, an officer of the lodge had waxed the floor with a powdered wax which left
the floor slippery in spots, including the place where Mrs. Tanner fell.
3 Tanner v. Columbus Lodge No. 11, Loyal Order of Moose, Docket No. 72 CV-05-1557
(C. P. Franklin County, April 23, 1974),
[V/ol. 9:3
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The Lodge moved for summary judgment,' pleading that an
unincorporated association was not amenable to suit by one of its members.
The trial court granted the motion,' ruling that the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in Koogler v. Koogler' precluded a member of an unincorporated
association from suing the association as an entity. The court of appeals
recognized that the enactment of Chapter 1745 of the Ohio Revised Code,
as well as several Ohio Supreme Court decisions, have cast doubt upon the
validity of Koogler. However, the court of appeals declined to overrule
Koogler, maintaining that such a decision was the sole prerogative of the
Ohio Supreme Court.7
The Ohio Supreme Court, in reversing the judgment of the court of
appeals and overruling Koogler,8 specifically relied upon the provisions of
Chapter 1745 of the Ohio Revised Code9 and subsequent judicial decisions
which have interpreted those provisions."0 The provisions of Chapter 1745
plainly state that any unincorporated association may sue or be sued as an
entity," that its assets, rather than the assets of its members, are subject to
judgments," and that an action against an unincorporated association would
not be affected by a change in officers or membership.' The Ohio Supreme
4 The Lodge, in its motion for summary judgment, recited the following fact: "Further, an
affadavit is attached indicating that the Columbus Lodge 11, Loyal Order of Moose is a
non-profit fraternal organization .... ." For a summary of the trial court's findings, see
Tanner v. Loyal Order of Moose, Civil No. 74 AP 185 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County
1974).
5 Tanner v. Loyal Order of Moose, 44 Ohio St. 2d 49, 337 N.E.2d 625 (1975).
6 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933). In Koogler, a member of an unincorporated
fraternal association sued the association for injuries sustained when a fire escape negligently
maintained by the lodge fell upon him. In denying the plaintiff the right to sue the lodge, the
court held that a member of an unincorporated association is engaged in a common enterprise
with his fellow members, and the acts of one member are equally imputable to every other
member.
7 Civil No. 74 AP 185, at 2237 (Ohio Ct. App. Franklin County 1974).
8 44 Ohio St. 2d at 52, 337 N.E.2d at 627.
9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1745.01, 1745.02, 1745.04 (Page 1964).
"'See Miazga v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N.E.2d 884 (1965);
Marsh v. General Grievance Comm., I Ohio St. 2d 165, 205 N.E.2d 571 (1965); Lyons v.
American Legion Post Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961).
"See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1745.01 (Page 1964), which provides that:
Any unincorporated association may contract or sue in behalf of those who are members
and, in its own behalf, be sued as an entity under the name by which it is commonly
known and called.
12 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1745.02 (Page 1964), which provides that:
All assets, property, funds, and any right or interest, at law or in equity, of such unincor-
porated association shall be subject to judgment, execution and other process. A money
judgment against such unincorporated association shall be enforced only against the
association as an entity and shall not be enforceable against the property of an individual
member of such association.
3 See Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1745.04 (Page 1964), which provides that:
No cause of action by or against any such unincorporated association shall abate by
reason of the death, removal, or resignation of any officer, or by the death or legal
Winter, 1976]
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Court concluded that the provisions of Chapter 1745 conferred upon unincor-
porated associations a legal identity separate from that of its individual
members for all purposes of law."
Historically, under common law, unincorporated associations were
considered aggregations of individuals pursuing a common purpose, 5 and
thus, in the absence of an enabling statute, 6 could not sue or be sued as a
separate entity. Each member of an unincorporated association was consid-
ered a co-principal of every other member. An act of one member of the
association committed in pursuit of the association's business was imputed
to all the other members. Thus, any member who brought suit against his
association was in effect suing himself and, therefore, was barred from
recovering against the association for a wrongful act of another member
or a common agent.'"
Ohio first attempted to modify the common law rule as to unincorporated
associations by the enactment of Section 10060 of the General Code," which
enabled an unincorporated religious or benevolent society to sue or be sued
in its common name. This statute was merely a procedural convenience, which
permitted a non-member to name an unincorporated association by its
common name in his complaint, saving the litigant the burden of identifying
and listing all the association members individually.' The General Code
incapacity of any member, or by reason of any change in membership of the association
during the pendency of the cause.
'4 44 Ohio St. 2d at 51, 337 N.E.2d at 626. See also Miazga v. Int'l. Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 2 Ohio App. 2d 158, 196 N.E.2d 327 (1964).
15 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Crystal Fountain Lodge, 80 Ga. 284, 4 S.E. 905 (1887). See also
H. Oleck, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND AssOcIATIONs 71-75 (3rd ed.
1974); Crane, Liability of Unincorporated Associations for Tortious Injury to a Member, 16
VAND. L. Rnv. 319 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Crane]; Annot. 14 A.L.R. 2d 473 (1950).
"s See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.42 (Page 1964). But see United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), where the court held that even in the absence of
an enabling statute, a labor union could be sued as an entity in federal court.
'7 Compare Goins v. Missouri Pac. Sys. Fed'n Maintenance of Way Employees Union, 272
F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1959); Marchitto v. Central R. R. of N.J., 9 NJ. 456, 88 A.2d 851
(1952), overruled by Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963);
Hromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941) in which the common law rule
barred recovery against a labor union, with DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333
(1950); Roschmann v. Sanborn, 315 Pa. 188, 172 A. 657 (1934); Mastrini v. Nuova Loggia
Monte Grappa, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 245 (1954); Duplis v. Rutland Aerie, No. 1001, Fraternal
Order of Eagles, 118 Vt. 438, 111 A.2d 727 (1955); Carr v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n,
128 Wash. 40, 221 P. 979 (1924), in which the common law rule barred recovery against
fraternal organizations.
18 Section 10060 was later incorporated into the Ohio Revised Code as Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1715.42 (Page 1964), which provides, in part, that: "Such an association or society may
sue or be sued, answer or be answered unto, plead or be impleaded in any court in this
state." See also, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1025 (McKinney 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 182
(Supp. 1975). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R. 2d 499 (1963).
19 The Koogler court noted that the General Code Provision merely confers upon an unincor-
[Vol. 9:3
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provision did not, however, identify these associations as legal entities and,
thus, did not change the common law relationship between an unincorporated
association and its individual members.2"
The Tanner decision, relying upon the broad language of Chapter 1745,
has effectively laid to rest the common law rule in Ohio. By holding that an
unincorporated association is a legal entity separate from its members, the
court has removed the obstacles which previously denied a member recovery
from his own asociation.21 In rejecting the common law rule, the court also
rejected Koogler, finding that the rationale in that case no longer governs
the liability of an unincorporated association to one of its members.2"
The Ohio Supreme Court in Tanner has expanded significantly the scope
of its earlier decisions in Lyons v. American Legion Post Realty Co.2" and
Miazga v. International Union of Operating Engineers.2" In Lyons a non-
member brought a wrongful death action against the eighty-one members of
the American Legion Post, which was an unincorporated association.2" The
court ruled that the non-member plaintiff could sue the members of the
association severably, rather than the association as an entity. The court
thereby concluded that the statutory remedy provided by Chapter 1745 did
not supersede the remedies already available to a non-member under common
law. However, the court rejected the view that mere membership in an
unincorporated association would render each member liable for the act of
another member, absent a showing that each member participated in the act
porated association a statutory name or classification. The court added: "We get no help
from these statutes on the question of liability." 127 Ohio St. at 60, 186 N.E. at 727.
20 See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.42 (Page 1964).
21 For Ohio cases recognizing the common law rule, see O'Neil v. Sea Bee Club, 69 Ohio
L. Abs. 442, 118 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); Hay v. Norwalk Lodge, 92 Ohio App.
14, 109 N.E.2d 481 (1951); McClees v. Grand Int'l. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 59 Ohio App.
447, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938); McCann v. Local 476, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 385 (1938). But see
Scanlon v. Duffield, 103 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1939) (distinguishing Koogler). See also Aeronca
Independent Union v. Aeronca Mfg. Co., 80 Ohio L. Abs. 342, 153 N.E.2d 718 (C.P. Butler
County 1958).
22 44 Ohio St. 2d at 52, 337 N.E.2d at 627, where the court held:
. . . a member of an unincorporated association may maintain an action against the
association for personal injuries resulting from the negligent acts of its agents, committed
while in the scope of their authority.
23 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961); accord., Marsh v. General Grievance Comm., 1
Ohio St. 2d 165, 205 N.E.2d 571 (1965). See also Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279
P.2d 427 (1955).
24 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N.E.2d 884 (1965).
25 The plaintiff did not name the American Legion Post, an unincorporated association, in
her complaint. She named the American Legion Post Realty Company, a corporation, and
the individual members of the unincorporated association. 172 Ohio St. at 332, 175 N.E.2d
at 734.
26 172 Ohio St. at 334, 175 N.E.2d at 736.
27 Id.
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creating liability.28 In limiting its consideration to remedies available to a
non-member against an unincorporated association and its members under
Chapter 1745, the Lyons court left unanswered the question of whether a
member, under any circumstance, can sue his association or his fellow
members individually.
The Ohio Supreme Court reached this question in Miazga by establishing
the right of a member of an unincorporated labor union to sue his union as
an entity." Relying upon the provisions of Chapter 1745,0 the court held
that the Koogler rationale, which denied a member of an unincorporated
association recovery from his own association, did not apply to labor unions.8
In justifying its decision, the court noted that strong precedent has recognized
the essential differences between the small, loosely organized voluntary
asociation of the Koogler era and the large modern labor unions existing
today."2 However, the court by its own language limited it's decision to labor
unions."3
While the Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily upon Chapter 1745 in
deciding Miazga,s" the court of appeals in Miazga,3" as well as the California
Supreme Court in Marshall v. International Longshoremen's & Warehouse-
men's Union,"6 reached a similar result based upon a conceptual analysis of
an unincorporated association. The court in Marshall established two factors
which identify an unincorporated association as a legal entity: the existence
of a group within the unincorporated association responsible for its daily
management; and, the non-participation of the individual member in the
decisions and acts of the group which give rise to liability." Based upon these
factors the court in Marshall reasoned that since the organizational structure
of a small unincorporated association, such as social clubs or church groups,
28 Id. at 337, 175 N.E.2d at 737.
29 2 Ohio St. 2d at 49, 205 N.E.2d at 884.30 See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
31 2 Ohio St. at 53, 205 N.E.2d at 887. Contra, Boozer v. United Auto Workers, 4 Ill. App.
3d 611, 279 N.E.2d 428 (1972).
32 2 Ohio St. at 52, 205 N.E.2d at 886.
33 Specifically limiting its holding to labor unions, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals without discussing the policy considerations raised by the lower court and
without applying Chapter 1745 to any other types of unincorporated associations. 2 Ohio St.
2d at 53, 205 N.E.2d 887.
34 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
35 2 Ohio App. 2d 153, 196 N.E.2d 324 (1964).
357 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962); accord, Inglis v. Operating
Eng'rs, 58 Cal. 2d 269, 373 P.2d 467, 23 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1962); White v. Cox, 17 Cal.App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971). See also International Ass'n. of Machinists v.Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 160 Tex. 203, 328S.W.2d 739 (1959); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782
(1960).
37 57 Cal. 2d at 783, 371 P.2d at 990, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
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facilitates individual participation in management, there is a greater oppor-
tunity for a member of such a group to have either participated in or
authorized the acts which have created the liability. Therefore, such a small
unincorporated association should not be considered a legal entity. In
comparison, the size and structure of a labor union or large fraternal
organization usually precludes membership participation in its daily opera-
tions. Since the majority of the members of a large unincorporated association
neither participate in, nor authorize the acts which have caused the injury,
there is no basis for the application of the common law rule. Therefore, the
California court concluded that a large unincorporated association should
be considered a separate legal entity. 8
In contrast to the limitations implied in Miazga39 and Marshall," the
Tanner decision appears to encompass not only labor unions, but any and
all unincorporated associations. 1 The Tanner court did not consider the
distinctions among different types of unincorporated associations which
concerned the Marshall court, but found the basis of its holding in the
language of Chapter 1745:
The import of R. C. 1745.01 . . . is clear-the Koogler conclusion,
that members of an unincorporated association are unable to sue the
association, is no longer tenable .... [B]y providing that any unincor-
porated association may be sued as an entity, it chose not to exclude
those groups maintained for fraternal, benevolent or social purposes."2
By its decision that any unincorporated association may sue or be sued
as an entity, the Tanner court has given the broadest possible interpretation
to the language of Chapter 1745. While the court could have limited its
decision to large unincorporated associations, such as the California court
did in Marshall, it did not choose to do so. Instead, the court relied upon the
literal meaning of the statute which fails to distinguish between different
forms of unincorporated associations.
By failing to differentiate between large and small unincorporated
associations the Tanner court has perhaps achieved a result that is over-
38 Compare 57 Cal. 2d at 783-84, 371 P.2d at 989, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 213, with 2 Ohio App. 2d
at 158-59, 196 N.E.2d at 327 [and] Crane, supra note 15, at 321.
39 See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
40 By refusing to apply the common law rule to labor unions, the Marshall Court did not
discredit its possible validity for other types of unincorporated associations. 57 Cal. 2d at
787 n. 1, 371 P.2d at 991 n. 1, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n. 1, where the court held: "We limit
our holding to labor unions only, leaving to future development the rules to be applied in
the case of other types of unincorporated associations." See generally note 38 and accom-
panying text supra.
4 144 Ohio St. 2d at 52, 337 N.E.2d at 627.
421d.
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inclusive. Koogler may still provide a useful rationale for determining the
liability of the members of a small unincorporated association in which
management and decision-making are shared by all the members of the
organization.
For example, a recent California decision, Steuer v. Phelps,"3 has held
that a church group, consisting of nine members, was not a legal entity.
In that case, a member of the church group was involved in an automobile
accident while negligently operating a car owned by the group. The plaintiffs,
who were not members of the church group, brought an action against the
nine individual members and the group as an entity. Relying upon Marshall,
the church members claimed their association was a legal entity and that
liability for their acts attached to the association rather than its individual
members. The court held that the principles of Marshall were inapplicable
to this particular group since it had no centralized management acting apart
from its individual members." The court noted that each member had
implicitly authorized the use of the car by the member who had the accident.
Such authorization, the court found, was sufficient to impute liability for
the negligent acts of one member to every other member. 5
When asked to apply the rule established in Tanner to small unincor-
porated associations in which the individual members participate in the
management and control of the group, the Ohio court will undoubtedly
consider the reasoning in Steuer. It is doubtful that the court will treat an
unincorporated association, such as the church group in Steuer, as a legal
entity, but the Tanner decision, as it now stands, certainly points to such a
result. Faced with a factual situation similar to that presented in Steuer, the
court may be required to clarify its holding in Tanner and limit its applica-
bility to unincorporated associations which conform to criteria established
in Marshall.4"
ROBERT M. BURLINGTON
43 41 Cal. App. 3d 468, 116 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1974).
44Id. at 472, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
45 Id.
46 In Lyons, the court noted that § 1745.01 does not necessarily require that a litigant
limit his cause of action to the unincorporated association as an entity, citing the language,
"any unincorporated association may sue or be sued as an entity" as an indication that alitigant has an option of suing the unincorporated association or its individual members.
172 Ohio St. at 334, 175 N.E.2d at 736. In future cases, the court may rely upon the permis-
sive language of the statute where, as in Steuer, it would be proper to treat a small group
as an aggregation rather than an entity.
[Vol. 9:3
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